r2i forum

Knowledge about defence issues is poor among Indian politicians. The same is true of Indian civvie street. Here is an opportunity for members to ask questions about Indian military. War is too important to be left to the Generals. My professional experience is serving in Indian army. Will try to answer once in a few days.

Thanks. I have a basic question. Once a war has been declared, which elected representatives are involved in day-to-day decision making (strategy and tactics) and how much? And who all are involved from our armed forces?

I would imagine that no elected rep will be involved with day to day tactics. That would be and should be in the hands of professionals - services commanders.

Politicos would be involved in making policy decisions like take the fight to the enemy territory or not. Whether to bomb cities or only the army positions. Army commanders may ask for some of these but the PM/DefMin, war cabinet will have to take the final call. Bureaucrats will probably advise as well and make suggestions. Of course any one with influence over the PM will put his/her oar in.

Now above is only my conjecture, area of my wars has been very limited and generally loosing ones. Gandharva can probably provide authentic info.

gandharva;591216Knowledge about defence issues is poor among Indian politicians. The same is true of Indian civvie street. Here is an opportunity for members to ask questions about Indian military.

It will help if you elaborate on the specific defense issues that both politicians and citizens lack knowledge of. It will provide us the opportunity to ask questions on those issues. Without the knowledge of the specific issue, it would be hard figure out the questions on those.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Military-leadership-must-be-involved-in-decision-making-Former-Army-chief-VP-Malik/articleshow/26277230.cms

A few issues raised by former Army chief, VP Malik:

1. Decision making is fractured.
2. Service chiefs were uninformed of nuclear test plans until 2 days prior.
3. Armed forces unaware that India had a chemical weapons program.
4. Decision to send troops to Sri Lanka - Army not kept in the loop.

Sounds pretty dire. Any comments?

When you say Indian army i remembered this incident.

Heroism of Indian Army which govt refuse to Talk about

13th Kumaon Battalion's Last Stand at Rezang La, Ladakh, in the Battle of Chushul, on November 18, 1962.

The C company of the 13th Kumaon Battalion, under Major Shaitan Singh (Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous) held off a fierce Chinese attack on November 18, 1962, at the Rezang La heights that they held. Massively outnumbered and outgunned, the defenders died almost to the last man, and expended their last round. All 114 men were killed or wounded. But they succeeded in blunting the Chinese assault, killing as many as a thousand Chinese in the process at Rezang La and at nearby Gurung Hill. Thereafter, the Chinese did not push further towards the Chushul plain. It was a critical checkpoint on a potential Chinese advance on Leh.

Above thing can be compared to below examples of heroism.

1. The Battle of Thermopylae in ancient Greece in 480 BCE, where 300 Spartans under Leonidas stopped a Persian army of 250,000 at a narrow mountain pass. They died to the last man, but provided enough time for the rest of the Greek army to escape to fight another day.

2.The 13th Light Brigade of the British Army at Balaclava, the Crimea, in 1854. Six hundred and seventy-three men rode at Russian artillery and were decimated.

3.At the Alamo in San Antonio, Texas, in 1836, several hundred Texans held out against the Mexican Army before they were killed to the last man.
Custer's Last Stand was the Battle of Little Bighorn, 1876, in Montana where the Sioux nation under Chief Sitting Bull wiped out George Custer and 265 men.

There is no official celebration of the Battle of Chushul as there is also an element of shame for Congress Govts. Congress governments were unwilling to talk about 1962 because it brings out the fact that 'someone had blunder'd' and that was their deity, Jawaharlal Nehru, along with his defence minister, V K Krishna Menon. Admitting this would leave them shamefaced, so they just let the soldiers 'but do and die'. Even the current government is unwilling to publish the Henderson Brooks report. Why? It will at least shed some light on what happened.

story of the valiant 13th Kumaon should be part of child's textbooks.

As of today there is only a small memorial at the site, which says:

How can a Man die Better than facing Fearful Odds,
For the Ashes of His Fathers and the Temples of His Gods,
To the sacred memory of the Heroes of Rezang La,
114 Martyrs of 13 Kumaon who fought to the Last Man,
Last Round, Against Hordes of Chinese on 18 November 1962.
Built by All Ranks 13th Battalion, The Kumaon Regiment.


The Battle of Chushul by L.N. Subramanian
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-3/lns.html

What employment opportunities are there for soldiers who retire young?

Sarkar07:

Political leadership has 3 people - PM, PM and PM. Inputs come from foreign ministry, NSA national security advisor who gets inputs from RAW and IB, and defence ministry. Inputs also come from the three services - it is a back and forth process. Political leadership also directs civvy agencies e.g. Railways top priority support for logistics. The services have strict chain of command. So 3 service chiefs provide input to PM. PM decides broad do and donts. Rest is upto service chiefs.

Example Kargil 1999: Northern Light Infantry troops crossed LOC, occupied heights and threatened highway. From a strict military perspective, the best response would have been attacking the enemy elsewhere across the LOC and IB, occupying real estate and then let diplomats trade and push back the NLI troops back to where they were. PM was not in favor of this option as it was viewed as significant escalation. PM wanted limited war.

Second best military response given limited war PM directive would have been to undertake flanking moves, encircle the NLI troops, get behind their lines and cut off logistics support. This would have involved crossing the LOC near Kargil. PM decided India would not cross LOC.

So military had to go for third best alternative i.e. frontal assault on NLI troops. Very costly. Especially in mountains. Fortunately some air support was allowed. Also arty support was allowed - arty in a rare event was used in direct fire mode.

Example 1971 war: PM decided we had to intervene in East Pak militarily. Fortunately PM listened to Sam Manekshaw about timing. Manekshaw asked for winter assault for 3 things - Chinese border passes would be closed, would give army time to prepare and East Pak riverine delta would not pose a logistical headache with no rains in winter.

Army was told to limit itself to holding action in the West. And go for quick victory in east.

Rest was up to armed forces. Army decided to bypass Pak army fortified garrisons in East Pak. And bypass towns. Even within army, local initiative plays a role - not everything comes from above as orders. Major General Nagra decided to move into Dacca and write the now famous note sent via his ADC to Niazi, on his own, when he saw the chance to go for the jugular.

Boca: Ask queries you have. Difficult to guess what another person does not know and ask. As for the average politician or civilian, they do not know which rank is higher - Lt Gen or Maj Gen.

Hirsh: Soldiers retire young. Fortunately, they get pension from the day they retire in their mid 30s. Ex-servicemen have some quotas. Otherwise soldier has to fend for himself. Many are from rural areas. They go back to farm related work or work in local establishments. More needs to be done. Pak has a Fauji Foundation that is an economic conglomerate.

gandharva;592106Sarkar07:


Second best military response given limited war PM directive would have been to undertake flanking moves, encircle the NLI troops, get behind their lines and cut off logistics support. This would have involved crossing the LOC near Kargil. PM decided India would not cross LOC.

As a x military man how do you see this? Weak Leadership or Pressure from US not to move fwd? Or technically was not advisable to do so by Army?

Lakshya, I have mentioned that crossing the LOC near Kargil at multiple points to flank and encircle the NLI troops was the second best option from a purely military perspective. I would not have said so if this option was not technically advisable.

I am sure US reaction was taken into account by PM. Did he exhibit weak leadership by asking army not to cross LOC knowing that his direction would entail more army casualties and fatalities? I do not think so. A PM looks at things beyond mere military perspective. It is the army chief's job to provide the PM with the army perspective. Gen Malik would have resigned if he did not agree with PM directive, unless the General was weak.

Civvy street understanding of leadership is poor. The army does not want war. It is chest thumping civvies who are trigger happy and label wise prudence as weak leadership and false bravado as strong leadership. Within the army, an officer who exhibits false bravado or trigger happiness will be seen through by fellow officers as well as men quickly. I have commanded an infantry platoon (30+ soldiers) in Operation Pawan and later an infantry Company (about 120 men) in COIN operations and have first hand experience of what leadership means.

In Operation Pawan, my unit got orders to deploy to the Vavuniya jungle. I was a platoon commander and the youngest officer in my unit and the only unmarried one. Our convoy was moving toward Vavuniya. I was in the lead Jonga. My Jonga hit a mine on the road and I was injured.

The entire convoy stopped. It could be an ambush. Instinct and training took over. Everyone sought cover. I got down and crouched beside the Jonga. It takes a couple of minutes to assess whether an ambush will occur. Even before this assessment took place, my Havildar came running for me exposing himself to potential fire. He pulled me out to safety. Fortunately it was not ambush.

Got flown to Tambaram base hospital. Recovered. Wanted to desperately rejoin my unit. Was denied permission until medically declared fit. I felt frustrated. Escaped the hospital for a few hours to go to a movie with a friend studying in IIT who was my schoolmate. Doctor was kind to my truancy and invited me to his home for dinner. Promptly fell in love with his daughter who is now my wife. Sent her notes every evening from Sri Lanka after rejoining my unit. She is the brain and queen of the family now.

Why did I want to rejoin my unit? Why did my Havildar go beyond call of duty to rescue me? It takes understanding of leadership and comradeship to see why.
In the army, we are taught that the welfare of my men comes always before mine. My men can see it. At platoon and Company commander levels, the commander has also to be physically more fit and strong than his men. And he has to be firm, fair and caring. Accept mistakes instead of blaming. The men see all of this. A bond develops that is very special.